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MANAGEMENT CONTROL,
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
LEARNING IN PUBLIC SECTOR
ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS AU:1
Max Visser
ABSTRACT
Purpose  In the past decades, Dutch public sector organizations
(PSOs) have been encouraged to become more “business-like” in their
internal control and accountability processes, following a more general
trend toward New Public Management (NPM) in Western societies.
However, in the Netherlands, this trend has met with increasing resis-
tance and discontent among public sector professionals. In this chapter, a
framework is developed that enables these public sector professionals
themselves to discuss and reflect on their internal control and account-
ability processes, and possibly to effect changes in it.
Methodology/approach  The chapter contains a critical analysis of
existing research on management control, accountability, and learning in
PSOs and describes a reflection and discussion session with a group of
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senior staff employees at a Dutch university, employing the framework
developed in this chapter.
Findings  It is argued that, generally speaking, the “business-like”
approach of NPM does not appear appropriate for most public sector
activities and may even negatively affect accountability and learning in
PSOs.
Social implications  The chapter critically assesses the impact of
NPM on PSOs and provides an alternative to NPM in the form of
experimentalist governance, with possible positive implications for the
effectiveness of public sector activities.
Originality/value  This chapter is among the first to adapt a frame-
work, developed for scientific and descriptive use, for more practical and
prescriptive purposes, that is, as an instrument for public sector profes-
sionals to discuss and reflect on their internal control and accountability
processes.
Keywords: Management control; public accountability; organizational
learning; New Public Management; experimentalist governance
INTRODUCTION
In the past decades, public sector organizations (hereafter PSOs) in the
Netherlands and most other developed countries have shown a marked
development in the direction of more “business-like” ways of working, mana-
ging, and controlling, a development known under the terms “Reinventing
government” (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) and “New Public Management”
(Diefenbach, 2009; Hood, 1995, hereafter NPM).
Recently, however, resistance against these NPM ways and methods has
grown in the Netherlands. In December 2011, seven appellate court judges
issued a Manifesto in which they criticized the ways in which the judiciary
increasingly came to be managed as a “biscuit factory, guided by output
requirements and hour prices.” Within a few weeks, the Manifesto was
signed by 700 of the 2,500 Dutch judges, a major signal from a normally
quiet and detached group of public sector professionals. Identical develop-
ments occurred at Dutch universities, where the metaphor of the “biscuit
factory” was invoked as well to criticize “academic forced labor” and
76 MAX VISSER
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39
“narrow efficiency operations.” Here dissatisfied professors, staff, and stu-
dents joined forces in critical movements called Science in Transition and
The New University, even leading to an occupation of university buildings
in Amsterdam in Spring 2015. In March 2015, a group of general practi-
tioners issued a Manifesto against “product thinking” and “forced competi-
tion” in primary health care, which four months later was signed by 7,845
of the 11,345 general practitioners in the Netherlands. In other Dutch
PSOs in the fields of public housing, police and law enforcement, and
juvenile care, similar complaints were fielded.
These complaints from practitioners about NPM are empirically corro-
borated by research in the fields of public and business administration and
management control,1 which as a rule finds many dysfunctional effects of
NPM (e.g., De Bruijn & Van Helden, 2006; Frey, Homberg & Osterloh,
2013; Groot, 1999; Jansen, 2008; Mak, 2008; Osborne, Radnor, Kinder &
Vidal, 2015; Spekle´ & Verbeeten, 2014; Teelken, 2012; Ter Bogt & Scapens,
2012; Tonkens, Hoijtink & Gulikers, 2013; Verbeeten, 2008; Walker & Van
der Zon, 2000; Yesilkagit & De Vries, 2002). However, most of this litera-
ture is descriptive and mainstream in nature. Consequently, it does not
offer concrete prescriptions to practitioners themselves to reflect on their
situation by asking questions like: which type of control is most
suitable for the activities in my organization? Which type of control is actu-
ally applied to those activities? What are the effects of this actual type of
control on the activities in this case? These questions are important,
because the (lack of) fit of control systems has major consequences for
organizational performance, accountability, and learning.
The purpose of this chapter is to enable a normative (if not critical)
reflection on and analysis of existing ways of managing and controlling
among practitioners in PSOs. For this analysis and reflection, the frame-
work of Hofstede (1978, 1981) is proposed. This framework has been influ-
ential in both public administration (e.g., Jansen, 2008; Noordegraaf &
Abma, 2003; Pidd, 2005) and management control research (e.g., Groot,
1999; Spekle´ & Verbeeten, 2014; Verbeeten, 2008; Verbeeten & Spekle´,
2015), but mainly in a theoretical and descriptive sense. However, more
than other, more recent management control frameworks (e.g., Ferreira &
Otley, 2009; Franco-Santos et al., 2012), the Hofstede framework also lends
itself well to a more practical and prescriptive use, that is, as an instrument
to enable reflection on and analysis of current ways of managing and
controlling within PSOs.
Toward that purpose, this chapter first contains a brief critical sketch
of NPM in the Netherlands, followed by a description of the framework
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of Hofstede, its implications for accountability and learning and an exam-
ple of a reflection and discussion session at a Dutch university. The chapter
closes with discussion and conclusions and sketches the contours of a post-
NPM public sector in the Netherlands.
NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS:
A CRITICAL SKETCH
Following the trend of NPM, PSOs in the Netherlands and most other
developed countries increasingly have faced public and political pressures
to become, first, more efficient and effective in their public services delivery
and, second, more transparent and accountable in their administrative pro-
cesses. In response to the first class of pressures, learning in and by PSOs
increasingly has received attention. PSOs should increase their ability to
detect and correct errors and problems early and rapidly, so as to improve
the quality and quantity of public services delivery (Rashman, Withers &
Hartley, 2009; Visser & Van der Togt, 2015). In response to the second
class of pressures, control and accountability in and by PSOs increasingly
have received attention. PSOs should be made publicly accountable for
their performance and achievements so as to increase both their responsive-
ness to social and political demands and the tax payers’ “value for money”
(Bovens, Schillemans & ’t Hart, 2008; Sabel, 2004; Sabel & Simon, 2011).
To accomplish this, PSOs have become both “flat” and “accountable”
(Hood, 1995; Sabel, 2004). Flat implies that policy executing agencies
and PSOs at “street level” are administratively separated from the central
policy-making and political authorities. Instead of the existing departmen-
tal pyramidal structure and hierarchical forms of governance, a more flat
structure with contractual forms of governance has been instituted, some-
times reducing the scope of government by contracting out to private par-
ties. Accountable implies that these street-level bureaucratic instances are
contractually obliged to achieve the general goals, set by central political
and bureaucratic authorities, by having those goals translated in detailed
administrative targets, by having their compliance with those targets quan-
titatively measured by numerous performance indicators, and by being
subject to financial incentive AU:3and sanction systems, designed in the service
of these targets (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Bovens, 2008).
However, NPM falls short of restoring government effectiveness and
accountability, for various reasons. First, it leads to a radical separation
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between policy conception and execution, providing executive, street-level
PSOs with a near-monopoly on knowledge and experience in their policy
areas, without mechanisms to feed this knowledge and experience back to
central political and administrative authorities. Second, the concentration
on narrow and detailed quantified targets jeopardizes coordination among
and joint problem solving by executive, street-level PSOs, in particular for
those problems that transcend these narrowly quantified boundaries (the
so-called “cross-cutting” or “wicked” problems). Typical NPM-solutions to
these problems involve either setting additional explicit quantitative targets
or creating a new agency to attack the wicked problems. However, both
solutions lead to either the increase of street-level discretion in determining
which targets to attain and which not (hence less accountability) or to the
establishment of centralized command and control (hence less flatness),
thus contradicting the original purposes of NPM (Sabel, 2004).
More in general, the quantitative management control, inherent in
NPM, leads to specific problems in policy execution. At least since the
early 1950s, it is commonly acknowledged in the literature that quantita-
tive management control is only suited for routine industrial production
processes (e.g., Blau, 1963; Ridgway, 1956; Schmidt, 1959). In that light,
quantitative management control appears particularly ill-suited for most
activities that PSOs employ, like policy formulation and implementation,
public service delivery, and law enforcement. This has led to a growing
literature on “gaming” in the public sector (Noordegraaf & Abma, 2003;
Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002), identifying a variety of dysfunctional and per-
verse effects of quantitative management control. Examples are additional
bureaucracy, information overload, tunnel vision, short term thinking
and planning, risk avoidance, fixation on measures, symbolic compliance
and impression management, and a general lack of system responsibility,
especially when several organizations contribute to public performance
(e.g., De Bruijn, 2002; Diefenbach, 2009; Frey et al., 2013; Groot, 1999;
Moynihan, 2005; Murphy & Skillen, 2015; Osborne et al., 2015; Pidd,
2005; Smith, 1995; Teelken, 2012; Townley, Cooper & Oakes, 2003;
Van Dooren, 2011; Verbeeten, 2008; Verbeeten & Spekle´, 2015; Walker &
Van der Zon, 2000).2
On the basis of both scientific research as well as practical experience,
NPM seems less successful in effecting learning and accountability in the
Dutch public sector, mainly because of the mismatch between the quantita-
tive management control systems and the nature of most public sector
activities. In the next section, the framework of Hofstede is presented in
order to analyze and reflect on this mismatch in PSOs.
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MANAGEMENT CONTROL OF PUBLIC SECTOR
ACTIVITIES: THE FRAMEWORK OF HOFSTEDE
The Dutch social scientist Geert Hofstede has become famous for his cul-
ture studies, but before turning to culture in the early 1980s, Hofstede
(1970, 1978, 1981) studied the role of management control systems in orga-
nizations. These systems play an important role in organizational learning,
defined as the detection and correction of errors or problems, whereby an
error occurs when organizational goals have not been achieved (Argyris &
Scho¨n, 1978). Management control systems often define the errors around
which learning processes are initiated, they provide a “lens or filter”
(Kloot, 1997) with which organizations perceive their own performance, set
against the perceived demands and developments in their environments.
Hofstede’s main concern is with what happens when management control
systems do not accurately reflect the errors or problems of the organization
or, even worse, when the control systems does not adequately fit in or
match the primary process of the organization. Evidently, when there is a
mismatch between these systems and the primary process, organizations
cannot adequately learn. They detect and correct the wrong errors or no
errors at all, or they fully misperceive how they really perform. In order to
assess that (mis)match between management control systems and organiza-
tional activities, Hofstede (1981) asks four questions:
(1) Are the objectives of the activity unambiguous or ambiguous?
Management control presupposes objectives, to the attainment of
which activities should be directed. But objectives or goals or ends may
be interpreted differently, reflecting conflicting political or financial
interests within PSOs. Further, there may be conflicting views on which
means bring about the desired ends or objectives. And in turbulent
environments, existing objectives may be rendered obsolete by new
developments, but organizations tend toward dynamic conservatism
and retain these objectives. In general, objectives are unambiguous
when consensus or a clear picture exists about them (e.g., fire brigades,
courts, garbage collectors). Objectives are ambiguous when they are
subject to conflicting norms and interests, as is the case in most PSOs.
(2) Are the outputs of the activity measurable or nonmeasurable?
Management control presupposes that output can be measured, so that
it can be compared to the objective of the activity concerned. But often
measurable means quantifiable, whereas many activities in PSO’s
can only assessed in qualitative and vague terms. For example, what is
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the output of an army in peace time? What is the output of the
Department of Foreign Affairs? Inputs often are well measurable, but
only interesting in relation to output.
(3) Are effects of management interventions in the activity known or
unknown? Management control presupposes that interventions in activ-
ities are possible, when the measured output does not conform to
the objective set. But it may be quite difficult to determine the exact
relationship between intervention and the desired output of an activity.
Further, there is always a time lag between intervention and its effect,
and there may be many other factors that influence output, but fall
outside the control systems.
(4) Is the activity repetitive or non-repetitive? Repetitive activities allow for
“learning by doing,” non-repetitive or unique activities do not.
Combining the answers to these four questions leads to a sixfold typol-
ogy of management control, presented as a flow chart in Fig. 1 (Hofstede,
1981, p. 196):
(1) Routine control is the simplest form, only applicable to routine indus-
trial production processes, for example, the production of bicycles or
cookies.
(2) Expert control occurs when the organization hires an expert who has
experience with the activities involved; it buys in “repetition.” An
example is the introduction of a new computer system in a production
plant.
(3) Trial and error control occurs when the organization learns from its
failures and successes through an ex post analysis of which interven-
tions were successful and which were not, for example, in new product
development or in post project analysis in consultancy firms.
(4) Intuitive control occurs when the organization has to rely on control
as an art, dependent on the intuition of the leader and the faith the
organization puts therein. Examples are leading a football team to
victory or turning around a firm in dire straits.
(5) Judgmental control occurs when the organization develops proxy or
surrogate measures to substitute for missing direct measures. An exam-
ple is fundamental scientific research.
(6) Political control occurs when objectives are interpreted differently, in
which case control is being determined through negotiations and
power positions at the top of the organization. Examples are most
PSOs.
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As a next step, Hofstede (1978, 1981) relates his typology to cybernetic
models for management control. Common here is a first-order cybernetic
model of control, connoting “a process in which a feedback loop is repre-
sented by using standards of performance, measuring system performance,
comparing that performance with standards, feeding back information
about unwanted variances in the system, and modifying the system”
(Green & Welsh, 1988, p. 289). This model is fully applicable to routine
control, and partly applicable to expert and trial and error control. It is,
however, not applicable to intuitive, judgmental, and political control. If it
is applied, it may lead to “psychological short-circuiting,” following which
Activity
Are objectives
unambiguous?
no Can ambiguity be
resolved?
no Political control
Yes Yes
Are outputs
measurable?
no Can acceptable
surrogate measures
be found?
no Judgmental
control
Yes Yes
Are effects of
interventions 
known?
no Is activity repetitive? no
Intuitive control
Yes Yes Trial & error
control
Is activity repetitive?
no Expert control
Yes Routine control
Fig. 1. Typology Management Control.
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employees attempt to work around the control systems by changing perfor-
mance objectives, changing output measurements, making unintended
interventions, by withdrawing from the control system altogether, or by
goal displacement, whereby the organization’s objectives are replaced by
the measurements. Through all these activities, management control
degrades to pseudo control or the illusion of control: the systems no longer
match the activities they are supposed to control (Hofstede, 1970, 1981;
Kerr, 1995).
This mismatch comes in two types, according to Hofstede. A Type I mis-
match is not using a cybernetic system where the situation in fact meets the
conditions for it, for example, using political control in a mass production
plant. A Type II mismatch is using a cybernetic system where the situation
does not meet the conditions for it. Hofstede (1981) mentions the example
of introducing the budgeting system of the Ford automobile corporation in
the US Army in the 1960s. This Type II mismatch has been aptly summar-
ized as “rewarding A, while hoping for B” (Kerr, 1995). It is often charac-
terized by a fascination with “objective,” simple quantifiable criteria for
performance measurement and an overemphasis on highly visible and
observable behaviors to the detriment of less visible and observable beha-
viors, which, however, may be equally or even more important for the
organization (Diefenbach, 2009).
Managers often react to instances of psychological short-circuiting by
intensifying the existing type of control, which, by virtue of its increasing
inappropriateness to the situation at hand, may strengthen the illusion of
control, in which the theories upon which control is based increasingly
tend to replace the real world. This illusion of control often only can be
maintained in a punitive atmosphere: “in this type of goal displacement,
officials cannot bear disappointment, and they cannot learn from
failure … Upon the appearance of discrepancy, the search is for deviants,
not deviance” (Landau & Stout, 1979, p. 153; Bevan & Hood, 2006; Kerr,
1995).
Whenever managers use these management control systems not only to
detect and correct deviations from established performance standards and
objectives but also to allot organizational responsibilities for achieving
performance goals (including the failure to do so) to employees, they create
internal and external accountability. Under the illusion of control and the
punitive atmosphere accompanying it, such accountability often takes on
an instrumental or calculative form: vertical and hierarchical, centered on
individuals who are believed to be driven by self-interest and opportunism,
in a context of legitimate mistrust, hard controls and a disciplining use of
83Management Control, Accountability, and Learning
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39
performance measures through rewards and punishments (McKernan,
2012; Messner, 2009; Vosselman, 2013). Paradoxically, in these ways instru-
mental or calculative accountability increases the “psychological short-
circuiting” it intends to diminish. It is conducive to framing “calculative
selves,” employees who under these circumstances may behave opportunis-
tically, show self-interest seeking behaviors and forms of trickery and deceit
(Argyris, 1987; Roberts, 2009).
This instrumental or calculative accountability in its turn is conducive to
what Argyris and Scho¨n (1978) call a Model I learning climate, character-
ized by a closed attitude among individuals and defensive routines in the
organization as a whole, exemplified in a general atmosphere of distrust
and lack of respect between managers and employers, blocked communica-
tion, contested problem definitions, and diplomacy and easing-in in the
case of errors to avoid the threat and embarrassment, associated with being
held accountable for errors and problems. This climate makes inquiry into
all but the most innocuous errors hard to achieve, and thus only may lead
to very limited learning, which in the longer run may endanger the organi-
zation’s survival.
An alternative tendency for management control here might be to
become more intuitive, judgmental, or political, removing the perverse
effects and incentives that accrue from cybernetic control under inap-
propriate conditions (Hofstede, 1981; Kerr, 1995). These alternative
forms of control may give rise to more relational or narrative forms of
accountability: horizontal and lateral, centered on networks of individuals
who are believed to be driven by commitment and shared ambitions, in a
context of trust, soft controls and an exploratory or developmental use
of performance measures through reflection and socializing (McKernan,
2012; Messner, 2009; Roberts, 2009; Vosselman, 2013). In these
ways, relational accountability may be conducive to framing “sociable
selves,” and thus to resolving the paradoxes inherent in instrumental
accountability.
This relational or narrative accountability in its turn is conducive to
what Argyris and Scho¨n (1978) call a Model II learning climate, character-
ized by an open attitude among individuals and productive reasoning in
the organization as a whole, exemplified in a general atmosphere of trust
and respect between managers and employers, open communication, fact-
based problem definitions, and honesty. This climate enables inquiry into
even cross-cutting or wicked problems, and thus may lead to deep and pro-
found learning, which in the longer run may ensure the organization’s
survival.
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APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK: A DISCUSSION
AND REFLECTION SESSION
In order to assess the suitability of Hofstede’s framework as an instrument
for reflection and analysis, it was used in a reflection and discussion session
with a group of senior staff employees at a Dutch university (not the
author’s) in September 2013. After reading Hofstede and a number of
newspaper articles on the present state of Dutch universities, the group
iscussion and reflection centered on three questions: (1) Which type of
control is most suitable for university activities? (2) Which type of control
is actually applied to university activities? (3) What are the effects of this
actual type of control on university activities in this case? For time reasons,
the discussion concentrated on university teaching and education, not on
research:
(1) Following Hofstede’s flow chart, the staff employees considered the
objectives of university teaching and education as relatively unambigu-
ous, while they viewed output both quantitatively (numbers of lectures,
workgroups, contact hours, etc.) and qualitatively (grading assign-
ments, term papers, exam results, etc.) as reasonably measurable. The
staff employees considered the effects of management interventions as
fairly unknown, among others thinking back to their own interventions
in the past. Finally, they viewed teaching and education as non-
repetitive activities: Although courses and classes are repeated every
year, ideally their contents are continuously being refreshed and
updated on the basis of last year’s experiences and new developments in
the field. All in all, the staff employees concluded that intuitive control
was most suitable for teaching and education activities in universities.
(2) Looking at the type of control actually applied to teaching and educa-
tion activities at this university, the staff employees’ opinions converged
on routine control.
(3) Reflecting on the effects of this actual type of control on teaching and
education activities, the staff employees in particular mentioned the
role of course evaluations, which at this university were generally
discussed by instructors and managers in a context of instrumental or
calculative accountability. On the other hand, the staff employees men-
tioned the role of internal teaching qualification courses, in which
instructors were supported and coached to develop their didactical and
organizational skills in a more relational or narrative accountability
context. However, these courses had been gradually condensed and
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made less intensive, since in 2011 an agreement with the Dutch
Minister of Education had been signed that at least 70 percent of all
teaching staff should have obtained a basic teaching qualification by
2016. With some qualifications, the staff employees concluded that the
situation at their university could be characterized as a Type II mis-
match. From the ensuing discussion, it appeared that the staff employ-
ees saw little room for changing the routine control systems in the near
future, though. The quantitative, instrumental mindset of control had
established itself firmly throughout the whole organization, from the
top-down.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION: TOWARD A
POST-NPM PUBLIC SECTOR?
The framework of Hofstede appears to be both theoretically and practically
suited for analyzing and discussing existing NPM ways of working, mana-
ging, and controlling in PSOs. As the reflection and discussion session
shows, it offers PSOs themselves an opportunity to reflect on and analyze
these ways. This could lead to a less “one size fit all” approach to public
sector management and governance, focusing attention on the desired fit or
match between control systems and activities in PSOs. More in general,
this could also lead to an exploration of alternative ways of working,
managing, and controlling, and thus to go beyond NPM as a dominant
model. However, in order to progress toward a post-NPM public sector,
three main conditions appear important, both bottom-up and top-down.
The first, bottom-up, condition is that employees in PSOs not only
confine themselves to reflection, analysis, and discussion. If they perceive a
true mismatch between control systems and the nature of the activities in
their organization, they should undertake internal action, in which a com-
bination of “loyalty” and “voice” appears most successful (Hirschman,
1970). The actions of the Dutch judges, university staff and students, and
general practitioners, referred to in the introduction of this chapter, appear
to be a case in point.
The second, top-down, condition is that central political and bureau-
cratic authorities stop setting detailed administrative targets with accompa-
nying performance indicators and incentive systems. Instead, these
authorities should set general goals and monitor the efforts of street-level
PSOs to achieve those goals by means of their own devising. Central
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authorities should intervene only when the efforts of street-level PSOs
fall short or are inadequately accounted for. Street-level PSOs should be
given room to develop policies, experiment with their implementation, and
to learn from one another’s problem solving in the pursuance of these
general goals, for example, through “best practices” (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2012;
Zeitlin, 2011).
The third condition, with both bottom-up and top-down elements, is
that street-level PSOs improve their own internal accountability and learn-
ing processes. External accountability in the direction of central political
and bureaucratic authorities should no longer be concerned with complying
with detailed administrative targets and performance indicators, but with
the quality of the internal monitoring and evaluation of policy experiments
and the lessons learned (and disseminated) from these experiments. In addi-
tion, street-level PSOs should work on their internal accountability toward
subjects and stakeholders of the policies concerned, for example, by insti-
tuting forms of internal democracy, participation, and co-creation (Gnan,
Hinna, Monteduro & Scarozza, 2013; Sabel, 2004; Tonkens et al., 2013).
Under these conditions, the street-level or “front line” of policy imple-
mentation acquires renewed importance (Lipsky, 1980; Maynard-Moody &
Musheno, 2003; Murphy & Skillen, 2015). These frontline PSOs will have
to excel in the detection and correction of errors and problems in policy
implementation, in reflecting on and inquiring into the effects of policy
experiments, and in flexibly adapting policies in response to that. To
achieve this, four requirements are needed in such frontline PSOs (Van
Grinsven & Visser, 2011; Visser, 2008; Wilson, 1989):
(1) Empowerment: Frontline employees should have as much room as
possible for independent decision-making, problem solving, and initia-
tive taking. Managers should be open to these new ideas and initiatives
by frontline employees, and they should have an enabling and motivat-
ing attitude, as opposed to a more coercive and controlling attitude.
Frontline staffing should have priority over administrative staffing at
headquarters or back offices, which should become “lean” and “mean.”
Management control systems should optimally match the nature of the
frontline activities.
(2) Error openness: Frontline employees should admit and surface errors
and problems in policy experiments. Managers should use these errors
and problems as opportunities for reflection and inquiry, as opposed
to opportunities for (threats of) punishments. Managers should build
trust with their employees, holding them accountable in relational or
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narrative ways. Existing routines and practices should be regularly eval-
uated and updated.
(3) Knowledge conversion: PSOs should maintain knowledge systems,
repositories, internal training programs, and formal and informal net-
works (both within and between PSOs) in order to translate, store, and
spread the “lessons learned” at the front line from previous error and
problem solving with regard to policy experiments.
(4) Adequate human resource management and development: PSOs should
pay close attention to selecting, educating, and training their (front
line) employees. They should put effort in team building and develop-
ing unit cohesion. They should support and motivate their employees
in such a way that they are able to take on the responsibilities of front-
line policy implementation, experimentation, and learning, which
brings us back full circle to the first requirement.
All these conditions and requirements are to a large extent still hopes for
the future, rather than features of current PSOs in Dutch (and generally
Western) society. But sooner or later changes will be necessary to lead
PSOs back from the ultimate nightmare of pure instrumental rationality,3
cogently sketched in the BBC television series Yes Minister. In the episode
“The compassionate society,” Minister Jim Hacker confronts his
Permanent Secretary Sir Humphrey Appleby with the fact that St Edward’s
Hospital employs 500 administrative staff, but no medical staff and
no patients: “Humphrey,” I said, very slowly and carefully. “There-are-
no-patients! That-is-what-a-hospital-is-for! Patients! Ill-people! Healing-the
sick!” Sir Humphrey was unmoved. “I agree, Minister,” he said, “but
nonetheless all of these vital tasks that I have listed here must be carried on
with or without patients.” “Why?” I asked. He looked blank. “Why?”
NOTES
1. As a field of research, management control is situated at the intersection of
management, accounting, and (economic) organization theory. Conceptually, its
boundaries appear to be defined by four related concepts: management control in a
narrow sense, connoting instruments to stimulate employee behavior in the direc-
tion of organizational objectives at a more operational level; performance manage-
ment, connoting instruments and systems to stimulate, measure, support, and
report organizational performance at both strategic and operational levels; internal
control, connoting systems to provide assurance regarding achievement of efficiency
and effectiveness operations, reliability reporting, and compliance; risk manage-
ment, connoting systems to identify and manage risks within preset boundaries to
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provide assurance regarding goal attainment (for recent reviews, see Ferreira &
Otley, 2009; Franco-Santos, Lucianetti & Bourne, 2012; Spekle´ & Verbeeten, 2014;
Strauss & Zecher, 2013). From these boundaries, a definition of management
control emerges as “the process by which managers assure that resources are
obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the organiza-
tion’s objectives” (Hofstede, 1978, p. 450).
2. In this respect, the quantitative NPM system appears to have much in
common with the system of “targets and terror,” prevalent in the USSR and other
communist countries before 1991 and notorious for its almost epidemic “gaming”
(Ericson, 1991; Nove, 1958). Bevan and Hood (2006, p. 519) observe: “ironically
perhaps, just as the targets system was collapsing in the USSR, the same basic
approach came to be much advocated for public services in the West by those who
believed in ‘results-driven government’ from the 1980s… It resonated with the ideas
put forward by economists about the power of well-chosen nume´raires linked with
well-crafted incentive systems.”
3. More radical critiques take this “nightmare of pure instrumental rationality”
as their point of departure. They view NPM as a form of “financialization” of
public life in which “financial performance, or some surrogate, is key to organiza-
tional success,” and which stems from the dual (and contradictory) role of the state
to protect capitalism on the one hand and to hold society together through various
public services on the other (Clegg, 2015, p. 14; Wigger & Buch-Hansen, 2013).
Instrumental rationality is conceived of as being conducive to “administrative evil,”
turning policy subjects into objects that, through technical abstraction and “objec-
tive,” “neutral” quantification in the form of performance measures and targets,
“can be and indeed are reduced to a set of quantitative measures” (Dillard &
Ruchala, 2005, p. 613; Diefenbach, 2009). This occurs, for example, when in aged
care elderly people are reduced to “two minutes washing and one minute dressing”;
when judges are being held accountable only for the quantitative output of
sentences, not for the quality thereof; when the police is being held accountable for
numbers of arrests and fines, not for the quality of public safety; when in psychiatric
care psychiatrists are judged only on the quantity of their caseload and “through-
put,” not on the quality of their treatment in terms of ending or alleviating psychic
pain and trauma, and more in general, when people are being laid off as sheer quan-
tities (“excess labor”). This quantification as the reduction of humans to measures
is considered dehumanizing, displaying the same fundamental logic that ultimately
led to the Holocaust and other forms of genocide (Adorno, 1966; Stokes &
Gabriel, 2010).
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